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The Investment Performance and Market Size of Defaulted Bonds and Bank Loans 
in 2003: Outlook for 2004/2005 
 
 
• The defaulted and distressed, public and private debt market in the 
United States performed exceptionally well in 2003.  The NYU Salomon 
Center Defaulted and Public Bond Index increased by over 85% and the 
Defaulted Bank Loan Index by 27.5% -- the Combined Index surged by 
49.3%.  Record annual performance was recorded for all three indexes. 
 
• The recovery rate on defaulted bonds (price just after default) rebounded 
impressively from a low of 25 cents on the dollar in 2002 to over 45 cents 
in 2003; likewise, the weighted average bank loan recovery rate in 2003 
increased substantially.  New defaulted bonds in 2003 fell to about $38.5 
billion in 2003 from the record total in 2002, resulting in a slightly below 
average, but still substantial default rate of 4.66%. 
 
• The face value size of the Combined Defaulted and Distressed, Public and 
Private debt market decreased by $356 billion from the record high year 
of $942 billion, one year earlier, to about $585 billion -- a reduction of 
38%.  The market size decrease in 2003 from $513 billion to $369 billion 
was a more modest 28%.  The drop was completely a function of the 
dramatic reduction in distressed debt (bonds selling at more than 1,000 
basis points over ten-year US Treasuries).  Still, a market size of $369 
billion is far greater than the estimated demand from dedicated 
distressed investors of $70-$80 billion. 
 
• Expected default rates in 2004 and 2005 are 3.5% and 4.1% respectively.  
The size of the Defaulted and Distressed debt market is expected to 
continue its fall by 14% in 2004 to $319 billion (market value) and to rise 
a bit in 2005 to $328 billion. 
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Executive Summary 
 The two big stories in 2003 for the distressed debt market were record levels of 
returns on defaulted bonds, bank loans and our combined index of bonds and loans and 
the significant shrinkage in the size of the distressed (bonds yielding more than 1,000 
basis points over US Treasuries) debt market.  After a lackluster year in 2002, the 
defaulted bond and bank loan market shot-up in 2003 with an almost uninterrupted string 
of positive monthly returns.  The yearly return on default bonds registered a mighty 85% 
and the market-to-face value of the index increased from 17% to 47% by year-end.  
Defaulted bank loans returns increased more modestly by 27.5%, still a record year since 
we began tracking this Index in 1996.  Our combined index of bonds and bank loans 
increased by a record 49.3%. 
 The size of defaulted bonds and bank loans remained virtually unchanged during 
the year as the amount of new defaults ($38.6 billion) approximated the amount of bonds 
emerging from reorganization ($32 billion).  But, it was the enormous fall in the 
proportion of the high yield plus defaulted debt market belonging to our category of 
distressed debt, from 21% to 5%, that reduced the combined public and private, defaulted 
and distressed market by as much as 38% to $585 billion (face value) and a 28% 
reduction in market value to $369 billion. 
 The key questions concern what do we expect about the size of this still 
substantial market going forward and the correlated expected return performance over the 
next two years.  To answer these questions and also to forecast future default rates, we 
utilize the following forecasting methodology.  We use our mortality rate method to 
predict future defaults based on the historical relationship between the credit quality of 
Investment Performance 2003 
 
4
 
new issuance and the aging effect of defaults.  Credit quality is determined by a blend of 
original issue bond ratings and our Z-Score rating equivalent approach.  This results in an 
expected default rate of 3.5% and 4.1% in 2004 and 2005, respectively -- down from 
4.7% in 2003, and a total defaulted and distressed debt market size, in terms of market 
values, of  $319 and $328 billion, respectively. 
 The following report presents our estimates of the current size and performance of 
defaulted and distressed debt in 2003 and our outlook for 2004/2005.  Based on some 
rather crude, but we think reasonable aggregate analysis, we expect defaulted bonds and 
bank loans to perform in a rather normal fashion with annual returns in the 10%-15% 
range.  We realize that many events and related markets’ movements may cause these 
estimates to be off from what we expect.  For in-depth discussions of the supply and 
demand elements of defaulted and distressed securities, as well as their performance 
attributes, see our reference list at the end of this report.  We also list our compilation of 
the names of distressed investors and their different strategies at the end of this report.  
The former now numbers at least 80 institutions. 
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Measuring and Monitoring Performance of Defaulted Debt 
 
Defaulted Bond Index 
 
The Altman-NYU Salomon Center Defaulted Bond Index (A-NYU Index) was 
developed in 1990 for the purpose of measuring and monitoring the performance of 
defaulted debt securities.1  The sample period of our Index begins in January 1987 and as 
of December 31, 2003 includes 124 issues from 63 firms (Figure 1).  The Index’s market 
value was $21.1 billion and its face value was $44.2 billion.  The size of our Index, as 
measured by the face value of public defaulted bonds is about four times the face value of 
the Index during the early 1990s and the market value is about twice the level of the 
Index at its highest measure, previously observed in 1992 and 2001.  Figure 1 exhibits 
various measures of our Index’s size since its December 1986 inception.  The variability 
in the number of issues, with a low of 30 in 1986 and a high of 231 in 1992, continues to 
be notable.  The huge new issue supply of non-investment grade debt in the years 1996-
1999 resulted in a continued increase of default amounts during subsequent years until 
2002.  Due to a drop in the default rate in 2003 and a culling of issues that do not trade 
regularly, we observe a marked reduction in 2003 in the numbers of issues and the face 
value of the Index to $44.2 billion.  Yet, the market value more than doubled because of 
the remarkable returns in 2003 and the significant increase of the average default 
recovery rate on new issues entering the Index this past year. 
                                                 
1 This index, originally developed in Altman’s Foothill Report (1990) is maintained and published on a 
monthly basis at the NYU Salomon Center of the Leonard N. Stern School of Business.  It is available, 
along with data and reports on high yield debt default rates and performance, from the Center (212-998-
0701 or 212-998-0709). 
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Defaulted Bank Loan Index 
Managers of distressed securities are commonly investing and arbitraging their 
portfolios in both distressed bonds and the private debt (particularly bank debt) of 
defaulting companies.  The observed increasing investment in defaulted private debt has 
been coincident with the bank loan market’s increasing size and liquidity as market 
makers have devoted considerable resources to bank debt trading.  In 2002, and again in 
2003, there was almost as much trading in distressed bank debt (loans trading at or below 
90 cents on the dollar) than in non-distressed loans (from Loan Pricing Corporation 
data).  Indeed, about 40% of the trading was in distressed and defaulted loans.  We 
responded in 1996 to this increased level of emphasis on bank loans by calculating an 
Index of Defaulted Bank Loan Facilities, as well as a Combined Index of Defaulted 
Bonds and Bank Loans. 
The Altman-NYU Salomon Center Index of Defaulted Bank Loans, like the 
defaulted bond index, is a market-weighted, monthly total return index comprised of U.S. 
companies.  The Index contained 17 facilities at its inception in December 1995 and has 
grown a high level of 141 facilities from 56 borrowers as of December 31, 2001 and had 
76 facilities from 43 borrowers at the end of 2003 (Figure 2).  The market value of this 
Index was at a record level of $23.9 billion at the end of 2003 with a face value of $39.0 
billion. 
Market/Face Value Ratios 
We consider the ratio of the aggregate market value to face value of the 
component securities that comprise our indexes to be an important measure of the 
defaulted debt markets’ current relative health and potential future returns.  This ratio for 
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defaulted bonds has ranged, at year-end, from a maximum level of 0.74 in 1987 to a 
minimum level of 0.15 in 2000 (Figure 1).  While the market/face value ratio has varied 
within a fairly narrow range of 0.30 to 0.55 during a majority of years in our 17-year 
sample period (1986-2003), abnormal annual returns for the Index has resulted in a 
number of market/face value ratio observations well outside of this range.  Indeed, the 
ratio had been 0.25 or below for the five-year period 1998-2002 and ended 2002 at 0.17.  
In 2003, the ratio almost tripled to 0.47.  The trend in the market/face value ratios of both 
defaulted bonds and bank loans can be seen clearly in Figure 3.  Note that the Defaulted 
Bank Loan Index dropped to its all time low ratio in 2002 of 0.46, but rebounded sharply 
to 0.61 one year later (year-end 2003). 
One can conclude that if there is movement in the average price level of both 
defaulted bonds and bank loans that resemble a regression-to-the-mean, then both indexes 
will move in that direction.  In the interest of full disclosure, we have noted this 
relationship in the past and have not observed the immediate anticipated change in market 
prices and returns.  Still one year ago in the “Altman Report on the Defaulted Bonds and 
Bank Loans,” Salomon Smith Barney, March 4, 2003, we wrote the following, “We still 
believe that both indexes are at unusually low levels, which bodes well for returns in 
2003.”  We did not anticipate, however, such a remarkable and rapid regression-to-the-
mean movement. 
From Figures 1 and 2, we also observe that the level of the market/face value 
ratios at the end of 2003 were somewhat above the mean and median level for the period 
1986-2003 for defaulted bonds (0.47 vs. 0.42 median) and exactly at the mean and 
median level (0.61) for defaulted bank loans.  This implies a fairly priced market and a 
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rather average expected performance for a “long-only” investment strategy on defaulted 
bonds and bank loans in 2004 and 2005.  Of course, many distressed debt investors do 
not follow a “long-only” strategy now and hedge their portfolios through various 
arbitrage strategies using shorting techniques such as capital-structure-arbitrage.  This 
involves a “long” investment in one security in the capital structure and a “short” on 
another tranche, for example, senior bank loans versus subordinated bonds. 
Performance Measurement 
Our Indexes include the securities of firms at various stages of reorganization 
either in bankruptcy or restructuring.  We calculate the returns for the Index using data 
compiled from just after default to the point when the bankrupt firm emerges from 
Chapter 11, is liquidated, or until the default is “cured” or resolved through an exchange.  
The securities of distressed restructured companies are also included in the Index until 
the restructuring is completed.  The Index includes bond issues of all seniorities, from 
senior-secured to junior-unsecured debt.  A study by Altman and Eberhart (1994), 
updated by Standard & Poor’s (Brand and Behar, 2000), measured the performance of 
defaulted debt from the time of original issuance through default and then to emergence 
from bankruptcy.  These studies conclude that the seniority of the issue is an extremely 
important determinant of the performance of defaulted securities over specific periods, 
whether from issuance to emergence or from default to emergence.  Our Indexes do not 
include convertible or international company issues, nor does it include distressed, but 
not defaulted, securities.  And, as noted above, the performance measure is based on a 
fully invested, long-only strategy. 
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2003 Performance of Defaulted Bonds and Bank Loans 
The Altman-NYU Salomon Center Index of Defaulted Bonds reversed its poor 
performance in 2002, increasing by an astounding 84.87% in 2003, marking the Index’s 
eleventh positive annual return in our 17-year period (Figures 4 and 5).  The Index 
experienced positive returns in every month in 2003, except in July.  Indeed, in seven of 
the 12 months the return exceeded five percent.  The extremely positive results are not 
surprising as the supply of newly defaulted bond issues decreased throughout the year, 
helping to drive up prices.2  Monthly returns for all 17 years of the Defaulted Bond Index 
are listed in Appendix A.  The level of the Index increased from 182.5 at the end of 2002 
to 337.5 at year-end 2003 (December 1986=100). 
The S&P 500 Stock Index, which finished with an annual return of  28.70% 
(assuming reinvestment of dividends) in 2003, was comparatively less volatile and 
experienced four months with positive returns in excess of 5%. 
Defaulted bond securities outperformed the total return on the S&P 500 Stock 
Index for the third year in a row.  The Defaulted Bond Index also outperformed the 
Citigroup High Yield Bond Market Index, which itself returned an impressive 30.6%.  
Ten-year government bonds underperformed all of our risky security indexes, posting a 
positive return of only 1.25%. 
Seventeen-Year Comparative Performance 
Figure 4 exhibits the return on defaulted bonds, common stocks, and high yield 
bonds over the entire seventeen-year sample period, 1987-2003.  The arithmetic annual 
average for the Altman-NYU Salomon Center Defaulted Bond Index dramatically 
                                                 
2 See Altman, Brady, Resti and Sironi (2002, 2004) for a detailed analysis of the supply/demand dynamic 
and its impact on corporate debt prices just after default. 
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increased to 10.89%, up by 4.62% from one year ago.  This arithmetic average annual 
return is now only less than three percent below that of the S&P 500 Stock Index 
(13.53% per year).  And, for the first time since 1997, our Defaulted Bond Index has an 
annual arithmetic average return above that of the Citigroup High Yield Bond Market 
Index (9.77% per year) for the sample period.  In seven of the 17 years, defaulted bonds 
performed better than both of the other two indexes, and in seven years our bond Index 
was the lowest performer. 
The standard deviation of annual returns for the defaulted bond index increased a 
fair amount in 2003, and it remains the highest of the three indexes.  Comparing volatility 
on a monthly basis, however, the standard deviation of monthly returns for defaulted 
bond issues (4.41%) is, in fact, slightly lower than that of the S&P 500 Stock Index 
(4.59%) while both of these indexes are considerably more volatile than the Citigroup 
High Yield Bond Index (2.16%).  The discrepancy between the standard deviations of 
high yield bonds and defaulted bonds is consistent with high yield bonds paying a fairly 
steady fixed interest component compared to defaulted bonds which, typically, do not pay 
interest. 
Defaulted Bank Loan Performance 
Today’s managers of distressed securities are more commonly investing in both 
distressed bonds and the private debt (particularly bank debt) of defaulting companies.  
As noted earlier, the observed increasing investment in defaulted private debt has been 
coincident with the bank loan market’s increasing size and liquidity as market makers 
have devoted considerable resources to bank debt trading.  Comparative informational 
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efficiency of the bank loan versus public bond daily prices has been recently analyzed in 
Altman, Gande and Saunders (2004), available from http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~ealtman. 
In 2003, our Defaulted Bank Loan Index performed very well compared to most 
asset classes, returning 27.48% for the year and closing at 153.6 (December 1995=100).  
Although this Index underperformed our Defaulted Bond Index as well as both the S&P 
500 Index and the Citigroup High Yield Bond Market Index (Figure 6), it still set a 
record for annual returns.  Defaulted bank loans are considerably less volatile.  Our Bank 
Loan Index also experienced positive returns in 11 months in 2003 with three topping 
five percent.  Appendix B shows the monthly performance of our Defaulted Bank Loan 
Index from its inception through December 31, 2003. 
The average annual return of the Defaulted Bank Loan Index since its inception in 
1996 almost doubled to 6.20% from 3.16% one year ago.  The arithmetic average annual 
return is slightly below that of the Defaulted Bond Index over the comparable period 
(7.04%) and still trails both the equity and high yield bond indexes (Figure 6).  The 
standard deviation of annual returns is considerably lower than that of the S&P Index and 
the Defaulted Bond Index but slightly above the Citigroup High Yield Bond Index. 
Combined Bond and Bank Loan Index 
Our Combined Defaulted Bond and Bank Loan Index is calculated based on the 
combined market values and total returns of public bonds and private bank loans.  The 
Index, from its inception in 1996 through 2003, is displayed in Appendix C.  The annual 
return for the Combined Index was up a record 49.3% for 2003.  This cumulative index 
level closed out the year at 145.1, up dramatically from 96.7 in 2002.  The Combined 
Index enables us to benchmark performance criteria for a more broadly defined defaulted 
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securities market.  At the end of 2003, the market values of the defaulted bond versus 
bank loan indexes were very close at $21.1 billion for bonds versus $22.9 billion for 
loans. 
Diversification: Management Styles and Return Correlations 
One strategy that our analysis suggests is to include defaulted debt in a larger 
portfolio of risky securities.  Several domestic pension funds and foreign portfolios have 
effectively used this strategy by allocating a portion of their total investments to defaulted 
debt money managers.  The principal idea for this strategy is that the returns from 
investing in distressed debt securities have relatively low correlations with most other 
major asset classes.  This can be clearly seen from the data on the correlation of returns 
that we have been tracking for many years. 
Figure 7 exhibits the correlation between the Altman-NYU Defaulted Bond Index 
and each of the two other risky asset classes - common stocks and high yield bonds - for 
the last 17 years.  As of December 31, 2003, we observe that the monthly return 
correlation between defaulted debt and the S&P 500 Stock Index is only 28.34%.  The 
correlation between defaulted bonds and S&P equities in 2003 is slightly above the 
correlation between these two asset classes as of last year (27.59%) but up about 4% from 
two years earlier.  The still low correlation is important to note because holders of 
defaulted debt usually exchange their debt for the equity of the emerged Chapter 11 
entity, unless they sell the debt just prior to emergence.  The correlation between these 
two asset classes on a quarterly basis is slightly higher at 35.2%.  Incidentally, the 
performance of emerging equities in 2003 was even more spectacular than defaulted 
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bonds and bank loans, many of which had returns in excess of 100% in less than one 
year. 
The correlation between defaulted bonds and high yield bonds is comparatively 
high.  The monthly correlation of returns is 61.85%, while the quarterly correlation 
between these two asset classes is 62.75% (Figure 7).  Both are up slightly from one year 
ago.  As was the case in the past, the correlation between the High Yield Bonds Index 
and the Defaulted Loan Index (see Figure 8) is lower than that of defaulted bonds and 
high yield bonds, at 46.22% and 51.64% for monthly and quarterly returns, respectively.  
The returns for defaulted bank loans still has a negative relationship with the S&P 500  
(-2.52%), compared to a more negative one last year.  Finally, the monthly returns’ 
correlation between our two-defaulted debt indexes (bonds and bank loans) was “only” 
61.21% (monthly) and 66.37% based on quarterly returns.  One might expect a somewhat 
higher correlation, but the reality perhaps reflects trading strategies of distressed 
investors, like capital structure arbitrage. 
Diversification by Manager Style 
Almost all portfolio managers involved in the distressed debt market are 
specialists in the sector, rather than investors in distressed securities within broader-based 
portfolios.  Therefore, the avenue of diversification appears to be primarily through the 
use of different investment managers (there are some rare exceptions where a fund 
combines investments in more traditional debt and equity securities combined with 
distressed securities).  Some “fund-of-funds” and foreign closed-end Funds have adopted 
the strategy of selecting managers of distressed securities with different styles.  In 
addition to diversifying across asset classes, these funds have a strategy of investing with 
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managers of distressed securities who practice different approaches (for example, active, 
passive, control, long-short, senior versus subordinate).  A list of about 80 dedicated 
distressed debt investors can be found in Appendix D and a listing of three major types of 
strategies and their sub-strategies is given in Appendix E.   
Proportion and Size of the Distressed and Defaulted Public and Private Debt 
Markets 
 
 The distressed and defaulted public debt proportion of the straight (non-
convertible) high yield and defaulted corporate debt markets in the United States 
comprised about 23% of the total market, down considerably from the 40% figure at the 
end of 2002 (see Figure 9).  Our measure of the total market here is the aggregation of 
high yield bonds ($886 billion at year-end) and the public defaulted bond issues that were 
still outstanding as of December 31, 2003 (estimated to be about $193 billion) for a total 
of $1,079 billion.  Note the big drop in 2003 in the proportion of high yield bonds that 
were classified as distressed (trading at least 1,000 basis points over risk-free ten-year US 
Treasuries).  This proportion dropped to about 5% as of year-end 2003 from 21% one 
year earlier.  The proportion of distressed debt compared to just the high yield market 
was about 5.7%. 
 The defaulted debt proportion remained fairly steady at 18% compared to 19% 
one year earlier.  This reflects the fact that new defaults in 2003 ($38 billion) were fairly 
close to the amount of bonds that were involved with companies emerging from Chapter 
11 bankruptcies (about $32 billion).  We can expect that emergences will vastly outpace 
new defaults in 2004, especially since several large bankruptcies are expected to be 
completed (for example, WorldCom and Enron) and the expected default rate and default 
amounts are expected to be lower in 2004. 
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Market Size 
 
 From Figure 10, we estimate the size of the defaulted and distressed public and 
private debt markets as of year-end 2003.  Total US distressed and defaulted debt fell 
dramatically in 2003 to about $585 billion (face value) from the record level of $942 
billion one year earlier.  The overwhelming reason for the precipitous drop is the amount 
of distressed debt.  Recall, we saw that the proportion of distressed bonds fell from 21% 
to about 5%. 
 The breakdown in 2003 of the total public defaulted and distressed bonds is $193 
billion of defaulted bonds and only $51 billion of distressed bond issues.  We again 
utilize a public to private debt ratio of 1.4:1 to estimate the size of the private debt market 
(primarily bank loans and private placements).  Combining our estimates of the public 
and private debt results in the $585 billion figure. 
 Our estimate for market values, combining the public and private debt market, 
was about $369 billion, down from $513 billion one year earlier.  The drop (28%) would 
have been even greater if the average defaulted and distressed bond and bank loan had 
not dramatically increased in value during the year.  Indeed, we increased our estimated 
average price of defaulted bonds to 45% of par based on levels from our Altman-NYU 
Salomon Center Defaulted Bond Index.  Commensurate increases in public distressed 
securities as well as private debt markets are indicated in Figure 10.  We expect that these 
markets will continue to diminish in size in the next year or two as default rates are 
expected to fall and the amount of bonds emerging from their reorganization status 
increases.  We will discuss this forecast further in the next section. 
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 Figure 11 shows our estimate of defaulted and distressed debt values for the 
period 1990 to 2003.  Note that the level of public and private defaulted and distressed 
debt is now somewhat below the level in 2000 but still a very sizeable “vulture” investing 
market.  Market values are fairly similar to the average in the 2000-2001 period, although 
clearly below the record level of 2002.  Note that certain years during the sample period 
shown in Figure 11 are not included because we did not perform the required analysis for 
those years. 
Forecasting Default Rates and Size of the Distressed and Defaulted Market 
 
 One of the more enduring aspects of the high yield bond market is the importance 
of default rates and the change in this risk parameter.  We have observed that when 
markets expect a very high level of defaults and the actual default rate is far below 
expectations, the yield spread on high yield bonds tends to fall dramatically and both the 
high yield and distressed debt markets’ return is likely to soar.  This certainly was the 
case in 1991 and again in 2003.  So, forecasting default rates is a useful exercise for high 
yield investors, not to mention those “vulture” investors whose market size depends on 
levels of required returns and defaults.  The following methodology was utilized to 
forecast default rates and the size of the market for distressed and defaulted securities in 
2004 and 2005. 
(1) Observe the recent history of credit quality metrics on corporate bond new 
issuance. 
 
(2) Forecast the size of the high yield market over the forecasting period. 
 
(3) Apply the mortality rate methodology and its historical empirical results to 
historical credit quality, new issuance statistics and to forecasted new issuance 
(in 2004 only). 
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(4) Aggregate defaults from each of the last ten years of new issuance by bond 
rating, adjusted for past defaults, calls, and other redemptions, to derive future 
defaults and then divide this total into the forecasted market size to ascertain 
future default rates. 
 
(5) Using forecasted future defaults and assuming a diminution in the current size 
of existing defaulted securities, we can derive defaulted bond levels in 2004 
and 2005.  By observing the trend in default levels, we can make some 
assumptions about distressed debt levels in 2004 and 2005 in order to forecast 
the market’s total size in those years. 
 
Credit Quality Levels of Past New Issuance 
 
 The standard technique to assess the credit quality of new issuance in the 
corporate bond market is simply to observe the bond ratings from the rating agencies on 
new issuance for the period 1994-2003.  We utilize the average quality over the past five 
years to derive estimates of new issuance and credit quality ratings in 2004 (necessary to 
forecast one year default levels in 2005).  Past defaults and all redemptions for 1994-
2003 and expected in 2004 are deducted from the historical new issuance totals to derive 
the appropriate cohort of bond levels, by rating, for our mortality rate forecast (see 
Altman [1989] for an analytical discussion of the mortality rate approach.  We call this 
the aged-bond-rating technique (ABR). 
 A modification of the ABR is to rely on our own measure of credit quality instead 
of the rating agencies, wherever sufficient data exists.  We utilized the more robust 
version of our Z-Score credit-scoring model, called the Z”-Score, to derive a credit score 
and then a bond-rating-equivalent of those scores.  We then substitute our bond-rating-
equivalent for the actual bond rating at issuance and apply it to past new issuance on a 
firm-by-firm basis.  Because this process was quite tedious and many firms’ data were 
not available from electronic databases, we mainly used the most recent estimates of Z”-
scores from Bloomberg (adding an appropriate constant term to get the bond-rating-
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equivalent).  We only were able to apply this technique to the last several years of new 
issuance due to data matching difficulties.  This technique, therefore, is really a blend of 
rating agency credit risk measures and the Z”-Score model.  We call this forecasting 
approach the aged-bond-rating-equivalent method (ABRE). 
 The particular Z-Score model we used was:3   
Z”-Score = 3.25 + 6.56 X1 + 3.26 X2 + 6.72 X3 + 1.05 X4 
Where: 
 X1 = Current Assets – Current Liabilities/Total Tangible Assets (TTA) 
 X2 = Retained Earnings/TTA 
 X3 = EBIT/TTA 
 X4 = Book Equity/Total Liabilities 
The Bond-Rating-Equivalents for the scores derived from this model are given in Figure 
12. 
Forecasted Results 
 
 Using the ABR technique (agency ratings on new corporate bond issuance), the 
mortality rate percentages from our companion Annual Report (“Defaults and Returns in 
the High Yield Bond Market: The Year 2003 in Review and Market Outlook,” NYU 
Salomon Center, February 2004, Figure 18) and high yield bond market size estimates for 
2004 and 2005 (mid-year), we forecast that the default rate will be 3.2% in 2004 and 
3.8% in 2005.  The size of the market for 2004 is based on the current (December 31, 
2003) size of $886.5 billion plus an expected growth in the first half of 2004 of about $60 
                                                 
3 We originally built this version of Z-Score for emerging market credits and published it in “Emerging 
Market Corporate Bonds - A Scoring System,” Salomon Brothers, May 15, 1995, (with J. Hartzell and M. 
Peck); reprinted in E. Altman, Bankruptcy, Credit Risk and High Yield Bonds, Blackwell, 2002 (Chapter 5). 
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billion.  We then assumed a 10% growth in the market for our estimate of 2005 market 
levels. 
 Utilizing our own Z”-Score approach (ABRE) for only about 25% of the new 
issues for 2002-2003 and the actual bond rating in other cases, our forecasted default rate 
was 3.8% in 2004 and 4.4% in 2005.  Note that the Z”-Score approach assesses the 
quality of recent new issuance as somewhat lower than the rating agencies. 
 We present our final forecasted default amounts and rates in Figure 13.  We 
decided to take an average of the ABR and the ABRE approaches to combine with our 
mortality rate estimate.  The result is a default rate of 3.5% and 4.1% for 2004 and 2005 
respectively.  The 2004 rate of 3.5% is a reduction of about 1.1% from the level in 2003. 
 The higher rate in 2005 represents a combination of higher marginal mortality 
rates in the second year after issuance, compared to the first year, applied to 2003 new 
issuance and to investors’ increased appetite for risk in 2003 (i.e., lower credit quality 
measures than in 2001-2002).  Note that both the rating agencies and especially our Z-
Score approach detect a deterioration in credit quality in 2003 new issuance from prior 
years.  Indeed, the proportion of split B, CCC and non-rated new issues in 2003 jumped 
to about 11% of new issuance compared to about 3.5% in 2001 and 2002.  This 
proportion was about 16% in 2000 and 20% in 1998, which helped to lead to very high 
default rates in 2001 and 2002.  In many cases, the bond rating equivalent of our Z-Score 
approach yielded lower bond ratings than the actual rating.  Please note we put all D-
rating equivalents into the CCC rated basket. 
 Figure 14 presents our estimates of the future size of distressed and defaulted 
debt.  These default estimates are based on our default rate and amount forecast (Figure 
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13) and estimates of the debt that will emerge from corporate restructurings, primarily 
Chapter 11, in the next two years.  It is always tricky to forecast default rates and market 
size estimates.  Still, the size of new defaults, recovery rates, and estimates of supply and 
demand in the distressed securities market are critical elements to expected performance 
and flow-of-funds expectations, so it is worth the effort. 
 Our forecast for the size of the defaulted public bond market starts from estimates 
of the size as of the end of 2003 ($193.2 billion from Figure 10).  We then add expected 
new defaults in 2004 and 2005 of $33.1 billion and $42.7 billion respectively (Figure 13) 
and subtract our estimate of bonds from companies emerging from corporate 
restructurings.  For the latter, we subtract $75 billion for each of 2004 and 2005.  Since 
the average Chapter 11 filing takes between 18-24 months to complete, we expect that 
the vast majority of existing defaulted debt as of the end of 2003 to disappear within two 
years.  We chose equal amounts to deduct in 2004 and 2005 because, among other things, 
the added amounts in 2004 coming from “seasoned” Chapter 11’s (e.g., WorldCom’s 
expected emergence in April 2004 from a July 2002 bankruptcy) could be similar to new 
defaults in 2004 (not in the 2003 figure) that will emerge in 2005.  As one can see, these 
estimates are a bit crude but still quite reasonable. 
 For distressed debt, we assume that the year-end 2003 proportion of the high yield 
market remains unchanged at 5% in 2004 and then increases somewhat to 7.5% as of 
year-end 2005.  We base the direction of the change (an increase) to the fact that we also 
expect defaults to increase in 2005 and the current level of distressed debt is historically 
quite low.  The exact amount of the increase is, however, an educated guess at best. 
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 We again assume a private-to-public debt ratio for defaulted and distressed firms 
of 1:4 to 1:0 to apply to our public debt forecasted levels.  We also assume that the 
market value (percent of par value) for defaulted and distressed public and private debt 
will increase slightly in 2004 and 2005 based on average annual positive return 
expectations. 
 Our final estimate of the combined sizes of the public and private, defaulted and 
distressed debt market (Figure 14) is about $482 billion (face value) and $319 billion 
(market value) in 2004 and $473 billion (face value) and $328 billion (market value) as 
of year-end 2005.  These values are similar to the market size found somewhere between 
1999 and 2000 levels (Figure 11).  Clearly, however, the shift in size based on where 
these markets present opportunities for distressed investors is expected to move toward 
distressed rather than defaulted securities. 
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Figure 1
SIZE OF THE ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER
DEFAULTED BOND INDEX
(1986 - 2003)
Year Number of Number of Face Value Market Value Market /
End Issues Firms ($ Billions) ($ Billions) Face Ratio
1986 30 10 1.7 0.5 0.29
1987 53 18 5.7 4.2 0.74
1988 91 34 5.2 2.7 0.52
1989 111 35 8.7 3.4 0.39
1990 173 68 18.7 5.1 0.27
1991 207 80 19.6 6.1 0.31
1992 231 90 21.7 11.1 0.51
1993 151 77 11.8 5.8 0.49
1994 93 35 6.3 3.3 0.52
1995 50 27 5.0 2.3 0.46
1996 39 28 5.3 2.4 0.45
1997 37 26 5.9 2.7 0.46
1998 36 30 5.5 1.4 0.25
1999 83 60 16.3 4.1 0.25
2000 129 72 27.8 4.3 0.15
2001 202 86 56.2 11.8 0.21
2002 166 113 61.6 10.4 0.17
2003 124 63 44.2 21.1 0.47
Mean 111 53 18.2 5.7 0.38
Median 102 48 10.3 4.2 0.42
Figure2
Year Number of Number of Face Value Market Value Market/
End Issues Firms ($ Billions) ($ Billions) Face Ratio
1995 17 14 2.9 2.0 0.69
1996 23 22 4.2 3.3 0.79
1997 18 15 3.4 2.4 0.71
1998 15 13 3.0 1.9 0.63
1999 45 23 12.9 6.8 0.53
2000 100 39 26.9 13.6 0.51
2001 141 56 44.7 23.8 0.53
2002 64 51 37.7 17.4 0.46
2003 76 43 39.0 23.9 0.61
Mean 55 31 19.4 10.6 0.61
Median 45 23 12.9 6.8 0.61
SIZE OF THE ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER
DEFAULTED BANK LOAN INDEX
(1995 - 2003)
Figure 3
DEFAULTED DEBT INDEXES:
MARKET-TO-FACE VALUE RATIO
(ANNUAL 1986 –2003)
Source: Altman-NYU Salomon Center Defaulted Debt Indexes
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
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B o nds
Year Altman-NYU Salomon Center Defaulted S&P 500 Stock Citigroup High Yield Bond Index
1987 37.85% 5.26% 4.67%
1988 26.49% 16.61% 13.47%
1989 -22.78% 31.68% 2.75%
1990 -17.08% -3.12% -7.04%
1991 43.11% 30.48% 39.93%
1992 15.39% 7.62% 17.86%
1993 27.91% 10.08% 17.36%
1994 6.66% 1.32% -1.25%
1995 11.26% 37.56% 19.71%
1996 10.21% 22.96% 11.29%
1997 -1.58% 34.36% 13.18%
1998 -26.91% 28.58% 3.60%
1999 11.34% 20.98% 1.74%
2000 -33.09% -9.11% -5.68%
2001 17.47% -11.87% 5.44%
2002 -5.98% -22.08% -1.53%
2003 84.87% 28.70% 30.62%
1987 - 2003 Arithmetic
Average (Annual) Rate 10.89% 13.53% 9.77%
Standard Deviation 29.13% 18.04% 12.65%
1987 - 2003 Compounded 7.42% 12.09% 9.12%
Average (Annual) Rate
1987 - 2003 Arithmetic
Average (Monthly) Rate 0.70% 1.06% 0.75%
Standard Deviation 4.41% 4.59% 2.16%
1987 - 2003 Compounded 0.64% 1.02% 0.78%
Average (Monthly) Rate
(1987 -2003)
ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER
Figure 4
DEFAULTED BOND INDEX
COMPARISON OF RETURNS
Figure 5
DEFAULTED BOND, STOCK, AND HIGH YIELD BOND INDICES
1987 - 2003
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Altman-NYU Salomon Center Defaulted Bond Index S&P 500 Index SSMB High Yield Index
Year Altman-NYU Salomon S&P 500 Citigroup High Yield 
1996 19.56% 22.96% 11.29%
1997 1.75% 34.36% 13.18%
1998 -10.22% 28.58% 3.60%
1999 0.65% 20.98% 1.74%
2000 -6.59% -9.11% -5.68%
2001 13.94% -11.87% 5.44%
2002 3.03% -22.08% -1.53%
2003 27.48% 28.70% 30.62%
1996 - 2003 Arithmetic
Average (Annual) Rate 6.20% 11.57% 7.33%
Standard Deviation 13.01% 22.14% 11.27%
1996 - 2003 Compounded 6.33% 10.91% 7.86%
Average (Annual) Rate
1996 - 2003 Arithmetic
Average (Monthly) Rate 0.51% 0.88% 0.58%
Standard Deviation 2.85% 4.92% 2.47%
1996 - 2003 Compounded 0.47% 0.76% 0.55%
Average (Monthly) Rate
(1996 - 2003)
FIGURE 6
ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER
DEFAULTED BANK LOAN INDEX
COMPARISON OF RETURNS
Correlation of Monthly Returns
Altman-NYU 
Defaulted 
Bond Index
S&P 500 
Stock Index
Citigroup High 
Yield Bond 
Index
Altman-NYU Defaulted Bond Index 100.00% 28.34% 61.85%
S&P 500 Stock Index  100.00% 50.62%
Citigroup High Yield Bond Index 100.00%
Correlation of Quarterly Returns
Altman-NYU 
Defaulted 
Bond Index
S&P 500 
Stock Index
Citigroup High 
Yield Bond 
Index
Altman-NYU Defaulted Bond Index 100.00% 35.18% 62.75%
S&P 500 Stock Index 100.00% 53.93%
Citigroup High Yield Bond Index 100.00%
Figure 7
CORRELATION OF ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER INDEXES
OF DEFAULTED BONDS WITH OTHER SPECULATIVE
SECURITIES INDEXES 1987 - 2003
Correlation of Monthly Returns
Altman-NYU 
Loan Index
S&P 500 
Stock Index
Citigroup High 
Yield Index
Altman-NYU 
Bond Index
Altman-NYU Loan Index 100.00% -2.52% 46.22% 61.02%
S&P 500 Stock Index  100.00% 50.30% 23.12%
Citigroup High Yield Index 100.00% 64.49%
Altman-NYU Bond Index 100.00%
Correlation of Quarterly Returns
Altman-NYU 
Loan Index
S&P 500 
Stock Index
Citigroup High 
Yield Index
Altman-NYU 
Bond Index
Altman-NYU Loan Index 100.00% 19.34% 51.64% 66.37%
S&P 500 Stock Index 100.00% 60.85% 40.89%
Citigroup High Yield Index 100.00% 62.14%
Altman-NYU Bond Index 100.00%
FIGURE 8
CORRELATION OF ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER INDEXES
OF DEFAULTED LOANS WITH OTHER SPECULATIVE
SECURITIES INDEXES 1996 - 2003
Public deals only.
Some years not available as no survey results available 
Source: Salomon Smith Barney Estimates.
Figure 9
DISTRESSED AND DEFAULTED DEBT AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL 
HIGH YIELD DEBT MARKET
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Figure 10
ESTIMATED FACE AND MARKET VALUES OF DEFAULTED AND 
DISTRESSED DEBT
(1) Calculated using: (2002 defaulted population) + (2003 defaults) - (2003 Emergences)
(2) For 12/31/02 and Q3, 2003, we use a private/public ratio of 1.40.
Source:  Edward Altman, NYU Salomon Center, Stern School of Business
Face Value Market Value
12/31/02 12/31/03 12/31/02 xFV 12/31/03 xFV
Public Debt
Defaulted 187.7$   193.2$  (1) 37.5$      0.20 86.9$     0.45
Distressed 204.7$   50.5$    102.4$    0.50 32.8$     0.65
Total Public 392.5$   243.7$  139.9$    119.8$   
Private Debt
Defaulted 262.8$   270.5$  (2) 157.7$    0.60 189.3$   (2) 0.70
Distressed 286.6$   70.7$    (2) 215.0$    0.75 60.1$     (2) 0.85
Total Private 549.5$   341.2$  372.7$    249.4$   
Total Public and Private 941.9$   584.9$  512.6$    369.2$   
Source: E. Altman, NYU Salomon Center .
Figure 11
Size of Defaulted And Distressed Debt Market ($ Billions)  (1990 – 2003)
9/15/2002
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Market Value
US Equivalent Rating Average EM Score Simple Size
AAA 8.15 8
AA+ 7.6 -
AA 7.3 18
AA- 7 15
A+ 6.85 24
A 6.65 42
A- 6.4 38
BBB+ 6.25 38
BBB 5.85 59
BBB- 5.65 52
BB+ 5.25 34
BB 4.95 25
BB- 4.75 65
B+ 4.5 78
B 4.15 115
B- 3.75 95
CCC+ 3.2 23
CCC 2.5 10
CCC- 1.75 6
D 0 14
Z”=3.25+6.56X1+3.26X2+6.72X3+1.05X4
US Bond Rating Equivalent Based on Adjusted Z” Score Model
Figure 12
High Default Default
Yield Market   Rate Amount
         ($ Billion)        (%)   ($ Billions)
2004 $946.5 3.50% $33.10
2005 $1,041.0 4.10% $42.70
Figure 13
FORECASTED HIGH YIELD MARKET SIZE, DEFAULTS AND
 DEFAULT RATES FOR 2004 AND 2005
Face Value Market Value
12/31/04 12/31/05 12/31/04 xFace Value 12/31/05 xFace Value
Public Debt
Defaulted 151.3$        119.0$        (1) 72.6$         0.48 59.5$         0.50
Distressed 49.7$          78.0$          (2) 32.3$         0.65 50.7$         0.65
Total Public 201.0$        197.0$        104.9$       110.2$       
Private Debt
Defaulted 211.8$        166.6$        (3) 154.6$       0.73 125.0$       0.75
Distressed 69.6$          109.2$        (3) 59.1$         0.85 92.8$         0.85
Total Private 281.4$        275.9$        213.8$       217.8$       
Total Public and Private 482.4$        472.9$        318.7$       328.0$       
(1)   Calculated using: (2003 defaulted population) + (2004 defaults) – (2004 emergences), same for 2005
(2)   Based on 5.0% of size of high yield market (in 2004, $994 billion); 7.5% of market in 2005 ($1,041 billion)
(3)     For 12/31/2004 and 12/31/2005, we use a private/public debt ratio of 1.40
Sources:  Estimated by Professor Edw ard Altman, NYU Stern School of Business from Citigroup’s High Yield Bond Database, NYU Salomon Center Defaulted Bond and 
Bank Loan Databases.
2004-2005 ($ billion)
FORECASTED FACE AND MARKET VALUES OF DEFAULTED AND DISTRESSED DEBT
Figure 14
APPENDIX A
 ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER INDEX
  OF DEFAULTED PUBLIC BONDS AND BANK LOANS
Returns (1987-2003) and comparison with
S&P 500 stock index and Citigroup High Yield Market Index
(December 1986 = 100)
PUBLIC PUBLIC BOND BANK LOAN S&P Citigroup-HYMI
BOND PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
MONTH INDEX RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN
JAN-87 109.802 9.802% 13.470% 2.828%
FEB-87 121.367 10.533% 3.950% 1.651%
MAR-87 125.946 3.773% 2.890% 1.106%
APR-87 127.523 1.252% -0.890% -2.181%
MAY-87 128.086 0.442% 0.870% -0.451%
JUN-87 131.797 2.897% 5.050% 1.382%
JUL-87 139.051 5.503% 5.070% 0.544%
AUG-87 139.775 0.521% 3.730% 1.002%
SEP-87 136.351 -2.450% -2.190% -2.301%
OCT-87 124.194 -8.916% -21.540% -2.672%
NOV-87 128.188 3.216% -8.240% 2.529%
DEC-87 137.846 7.534% 7.610% 1.328%
1987 YTD 37.846% 5.263% 4.667%
JAN-88 139.836 1.443% 4.210% 2.736%
FEB-88 147.445 5.442% 4.660% 2.713%
MAR-88 152.013 3.098% -3.090% -0.165%
APR-88 156.846 3.180% 1.110% 0.289%
MAY-88 155.424 -0.907% 0.870% 0.522%
JUN-88 166.943 7.411% 4.590% 1.912%
JUL-88 165.047 -1.136% -0.380% 1.057%
AUG-88 160.398 -2.817% -3.400% 0.329%
SEP-88 160.280 -0.073% 4.260% 1.008%
OCT-88 157.692 -1.615% 2.780% 1.558%
NOV-88 166.885 5.830% -1.430% 0.375%
DEC-88 174.358 4.478% 1.750% 0.423%
1988 YTD 26.488% 16.610% 13.473%
JAN-89 166.568 -4.468% 7.320% 1.500%
FEB-89 159.928 -3.986% -2.490% 0.672%
MAR-89 159.596 -0.207% 2.330% -0.089%
APR-89 162.878 2.056% 5.190% 0.295%
MAY-89 164.529 1.014% 4.050% 1.841%
JUN-89 164.381 -0.090% -0.570% 1.417%
JUL-89 168.429 2.462% 9.030% 0.474%
AUG-89 164.959 -2.060% 1.960% 0.494%
SEP-89 152.029 -7.838% -0.410% -0.952%
OCT-89 139.257 -8.401% -2.320% -1.582%
APPENDIX A
 ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER INDEX
  OF DEFAULTED PUBLIC BONDS AND BANK LOANS
Returns (1987-2003) and comparison with
S&P 500 stock index and Citigroup High Yield Market Index
(December 1986 = 100)
PUBLIC PUBLIC BOND BANK LOAN S&P Citigroup-HYMI
BOND PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
MONTH INDEX RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN
NOV-89 135.585 -2.637% 2.040% 0.224%
DEC-89 134.638 -0.698% 2.400% -0.090%
1989 YTD -22.781% 31.684% 4.231%
JAN-90 130.721 -2.909% -6.710% -1.954%
FEB-90 127.026 -2.826% 1.290% -1.456%
MAR-90 132.078 3.977% 2.650% 1.352%
APR-90 134.029 1.477% -2.500% 0.508%
MAY-90 132.374 -1.234% 9.750% 1.806%
JUN-90 130.115 -1.707% -0.680% 1.938%
JUL-90 133.091 2.287% -0.320% 2.113%
AUG-90 129.064 -3.026% -9.040% -3.830%
SEP-90 125.206 -2.989% -4.870% -4.350%
OCT-90 119.852 -4.276% -0.430% -2.550%
NOV-90 116.627 -2.691% 6.460% 0.850%
DEC-90 111.643 -4.273% 2.790% 1.440%
1990 YTD -17.079% -3.117% -4.352%
JAN-91 115.199 3.185% 4.360% 1.414%
FEB-91 124.975 8.486% 7.150% 7.423%
MAR-91 135.596 8.499% 2.420% 4.299%
APR-91 154.057 13.615% 0.240% 3.561%
MAY-91 158.670 2.994% 4.320% 0.488%
JUN-91 161.307 1.662% -4.580% 2.011%
JUL-91 169.993 5.385% 4.661% 2.396%
AUG-91 167.792 -1.295% 2.370% 2.102%
SEP-91 165.359 -1.450% -1.670% 1.274%
OCT-91 167.152 1.084% 1.340% 2.971%
NOV-91 165.614 -0.920% -4.030% 1.155%
DEC-91 159.768 -3.530% 11.437% 1.162%
1991 YTD 43.105% 30.481% 34.576%
JAN-92 171.039 7.055% -1.863% 3.496%
FEB-92 176.521 3.205% 1.300% 2.484%
MAR-92 183.396 3.895% -1.945% 1.395%
APR-92 182.896 -0.273% 2.935% 0.728%
MAY-92 187.589 2.566% 0.490% 1.595%
JUN-92 185.621 -1.049% -1.488% 1.242%
JUL-92 186.093 0.254% 4.085% 2.026%
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 ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER INDEX
  OF DEFAULTED PUBLIC BONDS AND BANK LOANS
Returns (1987-2003) and comparison with
S&P 500 stock index and Citigroup High Yield Market Index
(December 1986 = 100)
PUBLIC PUBLIC BOND BANK LOAN S&P Citigroup-HYMI
BOND PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
MONTH INDEX RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN
AUG-92 184.756 -0.718% -2.047% 1.324%
SEP-92 183.033 -0.933% 1.175% 1.140%
OCT-92 181.528 -0.822% 0.345% -1.263%
NOV-92 180.789 -0.407% 3.405% 1.416%
DEC-92 184.356 1.973% 1.227% 1.288%
1992 YTD 15.390% 7.622% 18.160%
JAN-93 194.590 5.551% 0.836% 2.462%
FEB-93 200.593 3.085% 1.363% 1.893%
MAR-93 208.930 4.156% 2.110% 1.734%
APR-93 209.492 0.269% -2.417% 0.717%
MAY-93 214.806 2.537% 2.675% 1.346%
JUN-93 218.677 1.802% 0.293% 1.879%
JUL-93 224.262 2.554% -0.402% 1.075%
AUG-93 226.792 1.128% 3.794% 0.953%
SEP-93 229.733 1.297% -0.767% 0.493%
OCT-93 231.211 0.643% 2.069% 1.884%
NOV-93 235.273 1.757% -0.953% 0.547%
DEC-93 235.819 0.232% 1.209% 1.000%
1993 YTD 27.915% 10.079% 17.182%
JAN-94 239.182 1.426% 3.400% 2.191%
FEB-94 246.835 3.200% -2.714% -0.719%
MAR-94 248.706 0.758% -4.360% -3.259%
APR-94 243.625 -2.043% 1.282% -1.169%
MAY-94 246.527 1.191% 1.641% -0.356%
JUN-94 243.904 -1.064% -2.451% 0.368%
JUL-94 245.060 0.474% 3.284% 0.703%
Aug-94 246.861 0.735% 4.100% 0.695%
Sep-94 250.310 1.397% -2.445% -0.038%
Oct-94 251.036 0.290% 2.247% 0.254%
Nov-94 252.281 0.496% -3.642% -0.850%
Dec-94 251.514 -0.304% 1.483% 1.112%
1994 YTD 6.656% 1.321% -1.165%
JAN-95 250.966 -0.218% 2.593% 1.413%
FEB-95 256.422 2.174% 3.897% 3.120%
MAR-95 267.266 4.229% 2.951% 1.392%
APR-95 267.514 0.093% 2.945% 2.341%
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 ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER INDEX
  OF DEFAULTED PUBLIC BONDS AND BANK LOANS
Returns (1987-2003) and comparison with
S&P 500 stock index and Citigroup High Yield Market Index
(December 1986 = 100)
PUBLIC PUBLIC BOND BANK LOAN S&P Citigroup-HYMI
BOND PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
MONTH INDEX RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN
May-95 282.016 5.421% 3.997% 3.124%
June-95 281.509 -0.180% 2.320% 0.764%
July-95 282.015 0.180% 3.310% 1.143%
Aug-95 282.100 0.030% 0.250% 0.610%
Sept-95 286.473 1.550% 4.220% 1.144%
Oct-95 273.008 -4.700% -0.357% 0.709%
Nov-95 278.393 1.972% 4.390% 0.976%
Dec-95 279.837 0.518% 1.926% 1.605%
1995 YTD 11.261% 37.565% 19.915%
Jan-96 286.857 2.509% 0.959% 3.404% 1.579%
Feb-96 309.090 7.750% 2.805% 0.927% 0.151%
Mar-96 323.112 4.537% 2.790% 0.963% -0.272%
Apr-96 329.509 1.980% -0.008% 1.474% 0.045%
May-96 333.711 1.275% 4.875% 2.579% 0.721%
Jun-96 344.767 3.313% 3.759% 0.381% 0.601%
Jul-96 340.995 -1.094% 1.376% -4.418% 0.679%
Aug-96 341.808 0.239% -1.142% 2.109% 1.033%
Sep-96 349.011 2.107% 0.791% 5.628% 2.146%
Oct-96 355.628 1.896% 1.694% 2.758% 1.096%
Nov-96 324.977 -8.619% 0.371% 7.559% 2.022%
Dec-96 308.399 -5.102% -0.104% -1.981% 0.769%
1996 YTD 10.207% 19.561% 22.960% 11.064%
Jan-97 303.637 -1.544% 1.879% 6.248% 0.517%
Feb-97 308.018 1.443% 2.400% 0.784% 1.433%
Mar-97 313.370 1.737% 0.771% -4.109% -1.111%
Apr-97 306.690 -2.132% -6.627% 5.970% 1.138%
May-97 307.026 0.109% -1.933% 6.880% 2.150%
Jun-97 305.282 -0.568% 3.596% 4.480% 1.523%
Jul-97 304.586 -0.228% 0.453% 7.957% 2.400%
Aug-97 311.492 2.267% 1.190% -5.602% -0.175%
Sep-97 316.597 1.639% 2.406% 5.477% 1.656%
Oct-97 315.203 -0.440% 0.241% -3.340% 0.664%
Nov-97 311.569 -1.153% -0.415% 4.629% 0.947%
Dec-97 303.533 -2.579% -1.817% 1.717% 0.949%
1997 YTD -1.578% 1.746% 34.359% 12.726%
Jan-98 303.5 0.00% -0.38% 1.11% 2.26%
APPENDIX A
 ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER INDEX
  OF DEFAULTED PUBLIC BONDS AND BANK LOANS
Returns (1987-2003) and comparison with
S&P 500 stock index and Citigroup High Yield Market Index
(December 1986 = 100)
PUBLIC PUBLIC BOND BANK LOAN S&P Citigroup-HYMI
BOND PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
MONTH INDEX RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN
Feb-98 309.5 1.96% -0.84% 7.21% 0.68%
Mar-98 312.0 0.82% 1.68% 5.12% 1.08%
Apr-98 312.6 0.19% 4.19% 1.01% 0.54%
May-98 319.7 2.27% 2.33% -1.72% 0.27%
Jun-98 318.8 -0.28% -0.99% 4.06% 0.22%
Jul-98 322.5 1.15% -0.05% -1.07% 0.80%
Aug-98 263.6 -18.25% -6.26% -14.46% -6.70%
Sep-98 234.1 -11.21% -6.16% 6.41% 1.23%
Oct-98 211.9 -9.48% -7.88% 8.13% -1.38%
Nov-98 227.4 7.32% 5.44% 6.06% 5.02%
Dec-98 221.9 -2.43% -0.85% 5.76% -0.07%
1998 YTD -26.91% -10.22% 28.58% 3.60%
Jan-99 222.3 0.22% 3.59% 4.18% 1.50%
Feb-99 231.0 3.91% -1.01% -3.11% -0.84%
Mar-99 242.8 5.07% -1.70% 4.00% 0.85%
Apr-99 269.8 11.15% 2.91% 3.87% 2.09%
May-99 266.7 -1.14% 1.92% -2.36% -1.57%
Jun-99 269.4 1.00% 2.58% 5.50% -0.22%
Jul-99 279.5 3.75% 1.31% -3.12% 0.22%
Aug-99 265.6 -4.96% -4.80% -0.50% -1.19%
Sep-99 251.5 -5.33% 1.29% -2.74% -0.76%
Oct-99 233.5 -7.13% -2.64% 6.33% -0.68%
Nov-99 249.3 6.75% -2.31% 2.04% 1.57%
Dec-99 247.0 -0.92% -0.12% 5.89% 0.84%
1999 YTD 11.34% 0.65% 20.98% 1.74%
Jan-00 255.7 3.50% 3.64% -5.02% -0.83%
Feb-00 253.1 -1.01% -2.27% -1.89% 0.24%
Mar-00 245.9 -2.86% -5.48% 9.77% -2.03%
Apr-00 232.0 -5.64% 1.02% -3.01% 0.40%
May-00 219.3 -5.46% -0.08% -2.05% -1.39%
Jun-00 221.9 1.16% -1.46% 2.47% 2.25%
Jul-00 221.2 -0.32% 0.38% -1.56% 1.09%
Aug-00 212.4 -3.96% -0.65% 6.21% 0.74%
Sep-00 211.1 -0.64% 0.86% -5.28% -1.07%
Oct-00 196.5 -6.91% -0.71% -0.42% -2.96%
Nov-00 176.6 -10.10% -1.39% -7.88% -4.09%
APPENDIX A
 ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER INDEX
  OF DEFAULTED PUBLIC BONDS AND BANK LOANS
Returns (1987-2003) and comparison with
S&P 500 stock index and Citigroup High Yield Market Index
(December 1986 = 100)
PUBLIC PUBLIC BOND BANK LOAN S&P Citigroup-HYMI
BOND PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
MONTH INDEX RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN
Dec-00 165.3 -6.42% -0.39% 0.49% 2.04%
2000 YTD -33.09% -6.59% -9.11% -5.68%
Jan-01 172.8 4.55% 4.11% 3.55% 6.74%
Feb-01 183.0 5.90% 6.71% -9.11% 1.19%
Mar-01 173.1 -5.43% 0.57% -6.33% -1.82%
Apr-01 168.6 -2.57% -2.31% 7.76% -1.47%
May-01 180.7 7.20% 2.04% 0.67% 1.61%
Jun-01 189.7 4.96% 1.27% -2.43% -2.75%
Jul-01 191.9 1.17% -0.22% -0.98% 1.88%
Aug-01 195.8 2.04% 3.05% -6.25% 1.37%
Sep-01 180.5 -7.84% -1.99% -8.07% -7.20%
Oct-01 190.2 5.35% -1.73% 1.91% 3.32%
Nov-01 193.1 1.57% 1.12% 7.67% 3.80%
Dec-01 194.1 0.52% 0.89% 0.88% -0.64%
2001 YTD 17.47% 13.94% -11.87% 5.44%
Jan-02 197.8 1.90% 3.51% -1.46% 0.43%
Feb-02 189.4 -4.26% -1.43% -1.93% -1.09%
Mar-02 193.4 2.12% 3.71% 3.76% 2.66%
Apr-02 195.9 1.29% 3.27% -6.06% 1.64%
May-02 191.7 -2.17% 0.21% -0.73% -1.24%
Jun-02 173.6 -9.44% -1.64% -7.12% -8.81%
Jul-02 166.3 -4.19% -4.27% -7.79% -4.52%
Aug-02 176.4 6.05% -4.37% 0.66% 3.81%
Sep-02 174.4 -1.11% -2.03% -10.86% -1.97%
Oct-02 172.2 -1.27% -1.25% 8.80% -0.34%
Nov-02 186.8 8.49% 5.37% 5.88% 7.63%
Dec-02 182.5 -2.28% 2.51% -5.87% 1.21%
2002 YTD -5.98% 3.03% -22.08% -1.53%
Jan-03 193.9 6.21% 3.22% -2.62% 3.72%
Feb-03 195.1 0.63% 0.20% -1.50% 1.34%
Mar-03 208.2 6.73% 0.66% 0.97% 3.37%
Apr-03 227.2 9.13% 2.92% 8.24% 6.21%
May-03 249.4 9.74% 3.05% 5.32% 0.66%
Jun-03 274.8 10.20% 6.73% 1.28% 3.11%
Jul-03 272.7 -0.78% -3.15% 1.76% -1.48%
Aug-03 284.3 4.29% 0.65% 1.95% 1.03%
APPENDIX A
 ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER INDEX
  OF DEFAULTED PUBLIC BONDS AND BANK LOANS
Returns (1987-2003) and comparison with
S&P 500 stock index and Citigroup High Yield Market Index
(December 1986 = 100)
PUBLIC PUBLIC BOND BANK LOAN S&P Citigroup-HYMI
BOND PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
MONTH INDEX RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN
Sep-03 303.9 6.86% 3.58% -1.06% 2.96%
Oct-03 323.0 6.31% 3.24% 5.66% 2.33%
Nov-03 326.9 1.21% 1.92% 0.88% 1.39%
Dec-03 337.5 3.22% 1.82% 5.24% 2.57%
2003 YTD 84.87% 27.48% 28.70% 30.62%
APPENDIX B
 ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER INDEX
  OF DEFAULTED BANK LOANS
Returns (1996-2003) and comparison with
S&P 500 stock index and Citigroup High Yield Market Index
(December 1995 = 100)
BANK BANK LOAN PUBLIC BOND S&P CITIGROUP
LOAN PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
MONTH INDEX RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN
Jan-96 101.0 0.96% 2.51% 3.40% 1.58%
Feb-96 103.8 2.80% 7.75% 0.93% 0.15%
Mar-96 106.7 2.79% 4.54% 0.96% -0.27%
Apr-96 106.7 -0.01% 1.98% 1.47% 0.05%
May-96 111.9 4.87% 1.28% 2.58% 0.72%
Jun-96 116.1 3.76% 3.31% 0.38% 0.60%
Jul-96 117.7 1.38% -1.09% -4.42% 0.68%
Aug-96 116.3 -1.14% 0.24% 2.11% 1.03%
Sep-96 117.3 0.79% 2.11% 5.63% 2.15%
Oct-96 119.2 1.69% 1.90% 2.76% 1.10%
Nov-96 119.7 0.37% -8.62% 7.56% 2.02%
Dec-96 119.6 -0.10% -5.10% -1.98% 0.77%
TOTAL 1996 RETURN 19.56% 10.21% 22.96% 11.06%
Jan-97 121.8 1.88% -1.54% 6.25% 0.52%
Feb-97 124.7 2.40% 1.44% 0.78% 1.43%
Mar-97 125.7 0.77% 1.74% -4.11% -1.11%
Apr-97 117.4 -6.63% -2.13% 5.97% 1.14%
May-97 115.1 -1.93% 0.11% 6.88% 2.15%
Jun-97 119.2 3.60% -0.57% 4.48% 1.52%
Jul-97 119.8 0.45% -0.23% 7.96% 2.40%
Aug-97 121.2 1.19% 2.27% -5.60% -0.18%
Sep-97 124.1 2.41% 1.64% 5.48% 1.66%
Oct-97 124.4 0.24% -0.44% -3.34% 0.66%
Nov-97 123.9 -0.41% -1.15% 4.63% 0.95%
Dec-97 121.6 -1.82% -2.58% 1.72% 0.95%
TOTAL 1997 RETURN 1.75% -1.58% 34.36% 12.73%
Jan-98 121.2 -0.38% 0.00% 1.11% 2.26%
Feb-98 120.2 -0.84% 1.96% 7.21% 0.68%
Mar-98 122.2 1.68% 0.82% 5.12% 1.08%
Apr-98 127.3 4.19% 0.19% 1.01% 0.54%
May-98 130.3 2.33% 2.27% -1.72% 0.27%
Jun-98 129.0 -0.99% -0.28% 4.06% 0.22%
Jul-98 128.9 -0.05% 1.15% -1.07% 0.80%
Aug-98 120.8 -6.26% -18.25% -14.46% -6.70%
Sep-98 113.4 -6.16% -11.21% 6.41% 1.23%
Oct-98 104.5 -7.88% -9.48% 8.13% -1.38%
Nov-98 110.2 5.44% 7.32% 6.06% 5.02%
Dec-98 109.2 -0.85% -2.43% 5.76% -0.07%
1998 YTD -10.22% -26.91% 28.58% 3.60%
APPENDIX B
 ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER INDEX
  OF DEFAULTED BANK LOANS
Returns (1996-2003) and comparison with
S&P 500 stock index and Citigroup High Yield Market Index
(December 1995 = 100)
BANK BANK LOAN PUBLIC BOND S&P CITIGROUP
LOAN PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
MONTH INDEX RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN
Jan-99 113.1 3.59% 0.22% 4.18% 1.50%
Feb-99 112.0 -1.01% 3.91% -3.11% -0.84%
Mar-99 110.1 -1.70% 5.07% 4.00% 0.85%
Apr-99 113.3 2.91% 11.15% 3.87% 2.09%
May-99 115.5 1.92% -1.14% -2.36% -1.57%
Jun-99 118.5 2.58% 1.00% 5.50% -0.22%
Jul-99 120.0 1.31% 3.75% -3.12% 0.22%
Aug-99 114.2 -4.80% -4.96% -0.50% -1.19%
Sep-99 115.7 1.29% -5.33% -2.74% -0.76%
Oct-99 112.7 -2.64% -7.13% 6.33% -0.68%
Nov-99 110.1 -2.31% 6.75% 2.04% 1.57%
Dec-99 109.9 -0.12% -0.92% 5.89% 0.84%
1999 YTD 0.65% 11.34% 20.98% 1.74%
Jan-00 113.9 3.64% 3.50% -5.02% -0.83%
Feb-00 111.3 -2.27% -1.01% -1.89% 0.24%
Mar-00 105.2 -5.48% -2.86% 9.77% -2.03%
Apr-00 106.3 1.02% -5.64% -3.01% 0.40%
May-00 106.2 -0.08% -5.46% -2.05% -1.39%
Jun-00 104.7 -1.46% 1.16% 2.47% 2.25%
Jul-00 105.1 0.38% -0.32% -1.56% 1.09%
Aug-00 104.4 -0.65% -3.96% 6.21% 0.74%
Sep-00 105.3 0.86% -0.64% -5.28% -1.07%
Oct-00 104.5 -0.71% -6.91% -0.42% -2.96%
Nov-00 103.1 -1.39% -10.10% -7.88% -4.09%
Dec-00 102.7 -0.39% -6.42% 0.49% 2.04%
2000 YTD -6.59% -33.09% -9.11% -5.68%
Jan-01 106.9 4.11% 4.55% 3.55% 6.74%
Feb-01 114.1 6.71% 5.90% -9.11% 1.19%
Mar-01 114.7 0.57% -5.43% -6.33% -1.82%
Apr-01 112.1 -2.31% -2.57% 7.76% -1.47%
May-01 114.3 2.04% 7.20% 0.67% 1.61%
Jun-01 115.8 1.27% 4.96% -2.43% -2.75%
Jul-01 115.5 -0.22% 1.17% -0.98% 1.88%
Aug-01 119.1 3.05% 2.04% -6.25% 1.37%
Sep-01 116.7 -1.99% -7.84% -8.07% -7.20%
Oct-01 114.7 -1.73% 5.35% 1.91% 3.32%
Nov-01 116.0 1.12% 1.57% 7.67% 3.80%
Dec-01 117.0 0.89% 0.52% 0.88% -0.64%
2001 YTD 13.94% 17.47% -11.87% 5.44%
Jan-02 121.1 3.51% 1.90% -1.46% 0.43%
APPENDIX B
 ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER INDEX
  OF DEFAULTED BANK LOANS
Returns (1996-2003) and comparison with
S&P 500 stock index and Citigroup High Yield Market Index
(December 1995 = 100)
BANK BANK LOAN PUBLIC BOND S&P CITIGROUP
LOAN PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
MONTH INDEX RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN
Feb-02 119.4 -1.43% -4.26% -1.93% -1.09%
Mar-02 123.8 3.71% 2.12% 3.76% 2.66%
Apr-02 127.8 3.27% 1.29% -6.06% 1.64%
May-02 128.1 0.21% -2.17% -0.73% -1.24%
Jun-02 126.0 -1.64% -9.44% -7.12% -8.81%
Jul-02 120.6 -4.27% -4.19% -7.79% -4.52%
Aug-02 115.3 -4.37% 6.05% 0.66% 3.81%
Sep-02 113.0 -2.03% -1.11% -10.86% -1.97%
Oct-02 111.6 -1.25% -1.27% 8.80% -0.34%
Nov-02 117.6 5.37% 8.49% 5.88% 7.63%
Dec-02 120.5 2.51% -2.28% -5.87% 1.21%
2002 YTD 3.03% -5.98% -22.08% -1.53%
Jan-03 124.4 3.22% 6.21% -2.62% 3.72%
Feb-03 124.7 0.20% 0.63% -1.50% 1.34%
Mar-03 125.5 0.66% 6.73% 0.97% 3.37%
Apr-03 129.1 2.92% 9.13% 8.24% 6.21%
May-03 133.1 3.05% 9.74% 5.32% 0.66%
Jun-03 142.0 6.73% 10.20% 1.28% 3.11%
Jul-03 137.6 -3.15% -0.78% 1.76% -1.48%
Aug-03 138.5 0.65% 4.29% 1.95% 1.03%
Sep-03 143.4 3.58% 6.86% -1.06% 2.96%
Oct-03 148.1 3.24% 6.31% 5.66% 2.33%
Nov-03 150.9 1.92% 1.21% 0.88% 1.39%
Dec-03 153.7 1.82% 3.22% 5.24% 2.57%
2003 YTD 27.48% 84.87% 28.70% 30.62%
APPENDIX C
 COMBINED ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER INDEX
OF DEFAULTED BOND AND BANK LOAN INDEX
(December 1995 = 100)
Monthly Year-to-Date 
Date Level Return Return
Dec-95 100.00
Jan-96 101.80 1.797% 1.797%
Feb-96 107.10 5.211% 7.088%
Mar-96 111.07 3.706% 11.048%
Apr-96 112.23 1.041% 12.226%
May-96 115.74 3.133% 15.742%
Jun-96 119.82 3.527% 19.825%
Jul-96 119.84 0.016% 19.844%
Aug-96 119.04 -0.670% 19.041%
Sep-96 120.79 1.469% 20.789%
Oct-96 122.97 1.802% 22.967%
Nov-96 118.29 -3.804% 18.289%
Dec-96 115.62 -2.257% 15.619%
Jan-97 116.2             0.48% 0.48%
Feb-97 118.6             2.04% 2.54%
Mar-97 119.9             1.15% 3.71%
Apr-97 114.6             -4.39% -0.83%
May-97 113.7             -0.85% -1.68%
Jun-97 115.4             1.51% -0.19%
Jul-97 115.6             0.19% -0.08%
Aug-97 117.5             1.72% 1.64%
Sep-97 119.8             2.01% 3.67%
Oct-97 119.7             -0.13% 3.54%
Nov-97 118.7             -0.79% 2.72%
Dec-97 116.1             -2.22% 0.44%
Jan-98 115.9             -0.20% -0.20%
Feb-98 116.3             0.38% 0.18%
Mar-98 117.8             1.32% 1.50%
Apr-98 121.0             2.67% 4.21%
May-98 123.8             2.31% 6.61%
Jun-98 123.0             -0.66% 5.91%
Jul-98 123.6             0.51% 6.45%
Aug-98 109.2             -11.67% -5.97%
Sep-98 100.0             -8.37% -13.83%
Oct-98 91.5               -8.52% -21.18%
Nov-98 97.2               6.20% -16.29%
Dec-98 95.7               -1.51% -17.55%
Jan-99 97.6               1.97% 1.97%
APPENDIX C
 COMBINED ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER INDEX
OF DEFAULTED BOND AND BANK LOAN INDEX
(December 1995 = 100)
Monthly Year-to-Date 
Date Level Return Return
Feb-99 98.4               0.78% 2.77%
Mar-99 99.2               0.84% 3.63%
Apr-99 105.5             6.31% 10.16%
May-99 105.9             0.45% 10.66%
Jun-99 107.7             1.66% 12.49%
Jul-99 110.4             2.49% 15.29%
Aug-99 105.0             -4.87% 9.67%
Sep-99 103.3             -1.58% 7.94%
Oct-99 98.8               -4.34% 3.26%
Nov-99 100.4             1.59% 4.90%
Dec-99 100.0             -0.43% 4.45%
Jan-00 103.6             3.59% 3.59%
Feb-00 101.7             -1.78% 1.74%
Mar-00 97.3               -4.31% -2.64%
Apr-00 95.6               -1.80% -4.39%
May-00 93.4               -2.26% -6.55%
Jun-00 93.1               -0.41% -6.93%
Jul-00 93.1               0.10% -6.85%
Aug-00 91.3               -2.02% -8.73%
Sep-00 91.4               0.13% -8.61%
Oct-00 89.1               -2.51% -10.90%
Nov-00 85.7               -3.77% -14.26%
Dec-00 84.2               -1.84% -15.84%
Jan-01 87.7               4.21% 4.21%
Feb-01 93.4               6.50% 10.99%
Mar-01 92.3               -1.19% 9.67%
Apr-01 90.1               -2.39% 7.05%
May-01 93.4               3.65% 10.96%
Jun-01 95.6               2.42% 13.64%
Jul-01 95.8               0.18% 13.84%
Aug-01 98.4               2.73% 16.95%
Sep-01 94.9               -3.61% 12.73%
Oct-01 95.3               0.45% 13.24%
Nov-01 96.5               1.27% 14.68%
Dec-01 97.2               0.77% 15.56%
Jan-02 100.1             2.96% 2.96%
Feb-02 97.7               -2.38% 0.52%
Mar-02 100.9             3.18% 3.71%
APPENDIX C
 COMBINED ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER INDEX
OF DEFAULTED BOND AND BANK LOAN INDEX
(December 1995 = 100)
Monthly Year-to-Date 
Date Level Return Return
Apr-02 103.5             2.60% 6.41%
May-02 102.8             -0.68% 5.68%
Jun-02 97.6               -5.10% 0.32%
Jul-02 93.4               -4.24% -3.93%
Aug-02 92.9               -0.54% -4.45%
Sep-02 91.3               -1.70% -6.07%
Oct-02 90.2               -1.26% -7.25%
Nov-02 96.1               6.51% -1.22%
Dec-02 96.7               0.69% -0.53%
Jan-03 100.9             4.35% 4.35%
Feb-03 101.3             0.38% 4.75%
Mar-03 104.5             3.17% 8.06%
Apr-03 110.4             5.63% 14.14%
May-03 116.9             5.89% 20.86%
Jun-03 126.3             8.03% 30.57%
Jul-03 123.6             -2.17% 27.74%
Aug-03 126.5             2.34% 30.73%
Sep-03 132.8             5.04% 37.31%
Oct-03 138.7             4.44% 43.41%
Nov-03 140.9             1.60% 45.70%
Dec-03 144.4             2.47% 49.30%
Distressed Debt Managers 2003
AEG Citadel Investments GSC Capital
Angelo, Gordon & Company Commonwealth H.I.G.
Apollo Management Concordia Advisors Halcyon/Slika (Alan B.) Management
Appaloosa Management Contrarian Capital HBV/Mellon
Ares Corporate Opportunities Fund Corsair Highbridge
Ashmore Asian Recovery Cypress Management Highland Capital
Avenue Capital Partners Cyrus JLL Partners
Bay Harbour Advisors Davidson Kempner KD Distressed Capital
Beltway Capital DDJ Capital Management King Street Advisors
Bennett Management Company Durham Asset Management LLC KPS Special Stuations Fund
Black Diamond Eagle Rock KS Distressed Debt
Blackstone Alternative Asset Mgmt. Epic Asset Management Lampe Conway
Buckeye Farallon Partners Leucadia National Corporations
Canyon Capital Forest Investment Management Levco Debt Opportunities
Cardinal Capital Franklin Mutual Recovery Litespeed Partners
Cargill GE LongAcre Capital Partners
Carl Marks Golden Tree LLC Longroad Asset Management
Carlyle Strategic Partners Gramercy Capital Marathon Capital LLC
Catlock Capital Greywolf MatlinPatterson Global Advisors
Cerebrus Partners Gruss Asset Management L.P.
Distressed Debt Managers 2003
MJ Whitman Mgmt Co. Radius Third Avenue Value Fund
Moore Asian Recovery Fund Republic Triage Capital
Murray Capital Resolution Partners Trilogy Capital
MW Post Restoration Capital Management Trust Company of the West
New Generation Advisers Resurgence Corporate Fund Turnberry Capital
Oakhill Salisbury Van Kampe
Oaktree Capital Satellite Varde Partners, Inc.
Och Ziff Friedheim Schultze Asset Management W.R. Ross & Co.
Owl Creek Capital Scoggin Wayland Fund
P. Schoenfeld Asset Management Seneca Wellspring Capital Partners
Pacholder Associates, Inc. Silvergang Wexford Capital
Pacific Alternative Asset Management Silverpoint Capital Whippoorwill Associates, Inc.
Patriach Spring Street William E. Simon & Sons
Pegasus Stanfield Capital Management Xerion
Pequot Capital Stark Investments York Capital
Pine Creek Stonehill
PMI Strategic Value Partners
PPM America Summit
Quadrangle Group LLC Sunrise Capital Partners
Questor Management TA Mckay & Co.
MHR Quadrangle Group LLC Sunrise Capital Partners
MJ Whitman Mgmt Co. Questor Management TA Mckay & Co.
Moore Asian Recovery Fund Radius Third Avenue Value Fund
Murray Capital Republic Triage Capital
MW Post Resolution Partners Trilogy Capital
New Generation Advisers Restoration Capital Management Trust Company of the West
Oakhill Resurgence Corporate Fund Turnberry Capital
Oaktree Capital Salisbury Van Kampe
Och Ziff Friedheim Satellite Varde Partners, Inc.
Owl Creek Capital Schultze Asset Management W.R. Ross & o.
P. Schoenfeld Asset Management Scoggin Wayland Fund
Pacholder Associates, Inc. Seneca Wellspring Capital Partners
Pacific Alternative Asset Management Silvergang Wexford Capital
Patriach Silverpoint Capital Whippoorwill Associates, Inc.
Pegasus Spring Street William E. Simon & Sons
Pequot Capital Stanfield Capital Management Xerion
Pine Creek Stark Investments York Capital
Pinewood Capital Partners LLC Stonehill
PMI Strategic Value Partners
PPM America Summit
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